Hillary Clinton on Nuclear Proliferation

This interview outlining Senator Hillary Clinton's views on nuclear proliferation was originally published in the Chicago Tribune on January 18, 2008

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Q: Would you make nonproliferation a priority for your first term in office by: 
First, Ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? And second, by upholding the U.S. commitment to Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which obligates the "nuclear five" to eliminate their stockpiles of nuclear weapons? And perhaps, in this way, encourage the non-declared nuclear states to dispose of their nuclear weapons also?

A: Yes. I will make nonproliferation a priority of my first term in office. I will seek Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a critical non-proliferation tool. U.S. ratification is also essential to restoring American leadership in this area and more broadly. As President, I will work to build the bipartisan support that would be needed to get it approved and ratified. In the absence of a CTBT, I am strongly committed to a continued moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. The Bush Administration's refusal to support the CTBT and flirtation with resuming nuclear testing has weakened our nation's ability to get global support for new steps to strengthen nonproliferation efforts and thereby weakened our nation's security.

I believe the United States must lead a global effort to reduce the terrible dangers of nuclear weapons. I will work toward the goal, shared by every President from Truman to Clinton, of one day ending nuclear weapons. As President I will work to verifiably reduce nuclear stockpiles, and keep nuclear weapons and materials from falling into the hands of terrorists and hostile regimes, while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent.

I believe it will be essential for the next president to reclaim the moral high ground on these issues. I have called on the United States to reassert our nonproliferation leadership by negotiating an accord to substantially and verifiably reduce the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. In the Senate I have introduced the Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Act, comprehensive legislation to raise security standards at nuclear sites worldwide and increase funding for nonproliferation efforts. As President, I will support efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime by reinforcing the IAEA verification system, tightening controls on transfers of sensitive technologies, and providing assurances of reliable fuel supply to countries that do not have their own uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities.

Q: Do you support or oppose the research, development and testing of a new generation of nuclear weapons?



A: I have opposed the Bush Administration's plans for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator ("bunker buster" warhead) as well as for a new low-yield nuclear warhead. In addition, given the judgment of most experts that existing U.S. warheads remain reliable and safe and that current warhead life extension programs are sound, the Administration's case for a so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) is not persuasive, and that is why I have co-sponsored legislation to block funding for the RRW until the Secretary of Defense completes a comprehensive review of the U.S. nuclear posture to clarify U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. In any event, there is no urgency to proceed, and we can afford to take the time to examine the implications of such a program carefully. More fundamentally, the Bush administration has dangerously put the cart before the horse, planning to rush ahead with new nuclear weapons without any considered assessment of what we need these weapons for or what the impact of building them would be on our effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. As President I will seek bipartisan support for a comprehensive nuclear weapons policy that takes into account the need to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent and the critical importance of restoring American leadership on nonproliferation.

Q: Would you work for the creation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone?



A: I support the goal of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, as do most of the countries of the Middle East, including Israel. Such a regional arrangement cannot be reached, however, until there is a comprehensive peace between Israel and all the other states of the Middle East. Moreover, such an agreement would require that all states of the region join and that verification measures be developed that would give the parties full confidence that others are complying. This is especially important in light of the IAEA's finding that Iran violated its nonproliferation obligations for over 18 years and the outrageous statement by the president of Iran that Israel should be wiped off the face of the earth. Finally, any regional arrangements must be developed through direct negotiations among all states of the region.

Q: Would you support or oppose direct negotiations with Iran and North Korea, including sanctions, in order to encourage those countries to eliminate their weapons programs in a verifiable manner?



A: I support engagement, even with difficult countries like North Korea and Iran. I believe the Bush administration's policy of refusing to talk to our adversaries has been very damaging to our security. That is why I support direct talks with Iran about its nuclear program, and the sooner the better, and why I have supported the Bush administration's belated but welcome engagement with North Korea.

Engaging with America's adversaries to reduce the threats they pose is an essential part of leadership. In dealing with our adversaries, I would plan carefully, and lay the groundwork to make sure that we achieve meaningful progress. That is the most effective way to restore American leadership in the world. President Bush has abdicated this responsibility, sitting back and doing nothing while North Korea walked across every red line we had set, kicking out inspectors, pulling out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, reprocessing plutonium, and ultimately testing a nuclear weapon. Only after North Korea had tested a nuclear weapon did the Bush Administration belatedly wake up to the reality that it must choose action over inaction.

The Bush administration says it supports talks with Iran on the nuclear issue, but only once Tehran meets certain conditions. Such conditions effectively preclude direct engagement with Iran on nuclear activities. An Administration's genuine willingness to engage will send two important messages: first, the Iranian people will see that our dispute is with their leaders, not with them; and second, the international community will see that we are pursuing every available diplomatic avenue to halt Iran's nuclear weapons program once and for all.

Q: Would you be willing to renounce the "first use" of nuclear weapons? Would you be willing also to seek an agreement with Russia to take nuclear weapons off "hair trigger" alert, which might lead other nations to do the same, which in turn could reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons?



A: The United States must lead a global effort to reduce the terrible dangers of nuclear weapons and to move toward the goal, shared by every President from Truman to Clinton, of one day ending nuclear weapons. I endorse the vision set out by Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, Bill Perry, and George Shultz of a world without nuclear weapons and their idea of taking practical steps toward that vision.

Q: Would you be willing to pressure Pakistan to allow international investigators to question Dr. A.Q. Khan, in the hopes that by questioning Khan, the extent of the damage he inflicted can be determined and contained? (Khan was the man who built Pakistan's clandestine uranium enrichment program that provided the fissile material for Pakistan's bomb program and later sold the technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya, and perhaps beyond.)

A: It is essential that international investigators, especially the IAEA, have direct access to Dr. Khan, who has first-hand knowledge of matters that are vital to the security of the United States and many other countries around the world. Mindful of the current crisis in Pakistan, it should be possible to work out arrangements that address the sensitivities of Pakistan, while meeting the compelling need of the international community to gain a more complete understanding of the activities carried out by Dr. Khan's network.